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A number of assets do not trade publicly, but are sold to a restricted group
of investors, who subsequently receive private information from the issuers.
Thus, the holders of such privately placed assets learn more quickly about
their assets than other agents. This paper studies the pricing implications
of this "learning by holding". In an economy in which investors are price-
takers and risk-neutral, and absent any insider trading or other transaction
costs, we show that risky assets command an excess expected return over
safe assets in the presence of learning by holding. This is reminiscent of
the "credit-spread puzzle" - the large spread between BBB and AAA rated
corporate bonds that is not explained by historical defaults, risk-aversion or
trading frictions. The intuition is that the seller of a risky bond needs to
o⁄er a "coordination premium" that helps potential buyers overcome their
fear of future illiquidity. Absent this premium, this fear could become self-
justi￿ed in the presence of learning by holding, because a future lemons
problem deters current market participation, and this in turn vindicates the
fear of a future lemons problem.Introduction
A number of securities, such as securitized pools of loans, are not traded
publicly, but are sold to institutional investors who from then on receive
from the issuer information that is not publicly available. Thus, investors in
such privately placed securities buy a bundle comprised of not only a claim to
future cash ￿ ows, but also of a ￿ ow of future priviledged information about
these cash ￿ ows. This paper studies the liquidity of such securities. More
precisely, the paper examines the pricing of assets whose holders learn more
quickly about than other investors - a feature that we de￿ne as "learning by
holding".
The paper develops a model in which an issuer seeks to sell long-term
securities to competitive potential investors who value liquidity because they
incur private liquidity shocks. If the investors have the ability to re-trade
with each other to meet their future liquidity needs, and if their private liq-
uidity shocks are diversi￿able, then the securities should be perfectly liquid.
Diversi￿able liquidity risks are not priced because investors acknowledge
that all the gains from trade between agents with di⁄erent future liquidity
needs will be realized. Thus, they do not require compensation for buying
long-term cash ￿ ows absent aggregate liquidity risk. The additional feature
that the securities will distribute proprietary information to their holders
in the future su¢ ces to give rise to self-ful￿lling illiquidity in this setup.
Because of this learning by holding, a small participation in the primary
market may subsequently create a lemons problem. Reciprocally, the fear of
a future lemons problem deters participation in the primary market. Thus,
current and future illiquidity reinforce each other, so much so that the fear
of future illiquidity is self-justi￿ed, and can lead to a current liquidity dry-up
even with an arbitrarily large pool of potential investors.
Adapting global games techniques to this setup, we derive a unique is-
suance price in which idiosyncratic liquidity risk is partially priced. Because
of coordination risk, su¢ ciently risky securities are o⁄ered at a discount over
safer securities. This "coordination premium" fosters coordination by mak-
ing potential investors more optimistic about market thickness. Investors
believe that other investors believe that the deal is attractive, and so on at
higher orders, and all investors are therefore con￿dent that they participate
in a thick, liquid market.
In sum, we develop a model in which investors are risk-neutral and price-
takers, and in which there are neither transaction costs, nor trade between
heterogeneously informed agents. Yet, we predict that su¢ ciently risky secu-
rities command a higher expected return than less risky securities, and that
this excess return is a highly nonlinear function of risk. This result o⁄ers
a theoretical explanation for the so-called "credit spread puzzle" - the fact
that there is a large di⁄erential spread between corporate bonds with fairly
similar credit risks. For instance, Amato and Remolona (2003) report that
1over the 1997-2003 period, investors required an excess spread of more than
a 100 basis points for holding a 5-year bond with an expected credit loss
of 20 basis points (a BBB-rated bond) over holding a 5-year bond with an
expected credit loss around 1 basis point ( AAA or AA-rated bonds). As
detailed in the body of the paper, most studies conclude that this spread
cannot be explained by credit risk, risk-aversion, taxes or other transaction
costs. In light of this "puzzle", we show that learning by holding su¢ ces
in theory to generate an excess expected return on risky bonds over safer
bonds absent any of the above frictions.
Learning by holding is particularly relevant for privately placed debt. A
private placement is a private sale of securities to a selected group of sophisti-
cated investors without general investor solicitation. Not only privately held
￿rms but also public corporations have wide recourse to private placements.1
Also, investment banks commonly place their structured products such as
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) privately. Lenders in private place-
ments are institutional investors who typically review their portfolio on a
quarterly basis, using nonpublic information provided by the issuers.2 In
securities law, private investors are therefore considered to be insiders, and
prohibited from using this nonpublic information to trade public securities.
That private investors almost by de￿nition "learn by holding" is not merely
a theoretical risk. This is evident in the growing concern among practi-
tioners that hedge funds might misuse the nonpublic information they glean
from small stakes in private placements made by public ￿rms.3 Also, evi-
dence provided in Acharya and Johnson (2007) suggests that our assumption
that ￿nancing relationships generate inside information may even apply to
companies with publicly traded stock. They ￿nd that insider trading in
the credit derivatives market around credit events is more pronounced for
such companies when, ceteris paribus, they have a larger number of banking
relationships.
Interestingly, our broad intuition that the fear of future adverse selection
generates thick-market externalities crops up in the practitioners￿literature.
In their popular textbook on CDOs, Lucas et al. (2006) explain the fact that
secondary markets for CDOs are relatively illiquid with what they refer to
as their "safety in numbers theory". As they put it:
"Some primary CDO buyers will not consider the secondary
1In a comprehensive set of 13,000 debt and equity issues by public U.S. corporations
during the 1995-2003 period studied by Gomes and Phillips (2005), more than half of the
transactions are private.
2In the case of CDOs, this proprietary information would typically feature detailed
information about the pool of borrowers, for instance about the evolution of the number
of delinquencies.
3See, e.g., "The New Insider Trading? Concerns mount that private information fur-
nished to lenders is seeping into trading," Investment Dealers￿Digest, 6/13/2005, or "More
Heat on Hedge Funds", Business Week, 2/6/06.
2market because they feel safer buying into the initial distribution
of a CDO, when a number of other investors are also making the
same decision. Other primary-only investors feel uneasy about
buying something another investor is selling."
In addition, Lucas et al. claim that better dissemination of information
by CDO arrangers is a crucial factor in the improvement in CDOs￿liquidity.
Many observers argue that opacity and lack of public information about
market participation were responsible for the sudden and dramatic evapo-
ration of liquidity in securitization markets in August 2007. For instance,
The Economist wrote in its 20/09/2007 edition:
"What should banks and regulators do about all this? In the
short run, the focus will be on transparency. Investors need to
know who is holding what..."
As discussed in more detail in Section 4:3, our theory also implies that
committing to release public information about CDO market thickness is an
appropriate response to such liquidity dry-ups.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to study the liquidity
implications of this "learning by holding" assumption. That the liquidity
of ￿nancial assets can be self-ful￿lling may stem from a number of other
frictions. For instance, in Allen and Gale (1994), and Pagano (1989), the
prices at which trades are executed are more sensitive to quantities if par-
ticipation in the stock market is limited. This potential sensitivity deters
investors from participating in the stock market for hedging purposes. In
presence of exogenous costs of participating in the market, low participation
and a high price impact reinforce each other, leading to multiple￿ liquid or
illiquid￿ equilibria. In a setup with insider trading, Dow (2004) establishes
that hedging activity may have multiple equilibrium levels. A key distinc-
tion between these contributions and our paper - besides, of course, the
di⁄erence in the frictions - is that we develop a setup in which the risk of co-
ordination failure, despite being priced, almost never materializes, precisely
because the seller gives up a coordination premium to avoid it.
1 Model
1.1 Outline
In an economy with three dates t = 0; 1; and 2, there are two classes of
agents: an issuer and n investors, where n ￿ 2. Investors value liquidity:
Each investor maximizes a utility function with stochastic time preference.
At t = 0, the utility of an investor is





3where e ￿ is a binary random variable whose realization at date 1 is
~ ￿ =
￿
￿ 2 (0;1) with prob. q
0 with prob. 1 ￿ q:
At t = 1, each investor learns privately whether she discounts date-2
consumption or not. We refer to investors who discount future consumption
as "impatient" or "distressed" investors.
The issuer aims to maximize the expected proceeds from the issuance of
n identical bonds backed by an asset that generates consumption at t = 2.
The date-2 payo⁄ of the asset is
￿
n with prob. 1 ￿ d
0 with prob. d
;
where d 2 (0;1). The collateral￿ s payo⁄ and investors￿liquidity shocks are
independent random variables.
At t = 0, the issuer posts a bond price p. Investors simultaneously
decide to accept or decline the o⁄er. Also, in order to satisfy investors￿
demand for liquidity, the issuer makes a market at date 1. Investors who
want to o⁄-load bonds at t = 1 entrust them to the issuer, who makes
take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers to the other investors. The issuer acts in the best
interests of the sellers, and o⁄ers the highest possible price. Equivalently,
she maximizes dollar trading volume in the secondary market. Frictions
such as search and bargaining are therefore not a source of illiquidity in this
environment.4 In fact, absent any other friction, the bonds would be liquid
in this setup, in the sense that the date-0 posted price p would re￿ ect only
aggregate liquidity risk:
p = (1 ￿ qn￿)(1 ￿ d):
When contemplating investing in the bond at t = 0, investors would antic-
ipate that the bond can be sold at a price equal to (1 ￿ d) at t = 1, unless
all investors are hit by a liquidity shock.
The additional crucial feature of the model, which gives rise to thick
market externalities, is the assumption of learning by holding. It is assumed
that holding the bond between dates 0 and 1 enables investors to acquire
private information about the quality of the collateral. For simplicity, an
investor knows the date-2 asset￿ s payo⁄ at date 1 if she bought the bond at
date 0. In the following, an investor is referred to as an "insider" if she buys
the bond at date 0, and as an "outsider" if she does not.
The timing of the game may be summarized as follows:
￿ At t = 0, investors decide whether to accept or decline the o⁄er to pay
p for a bond.
4See Du¢ e, Gb arleanu, and Pedersen (2005) for a model of such frictions in over-the-
counter markets.
4￿ Between t = 0 and t = 1, insiders learn the date-2 payo⁄.
￿ At t = 1, investors privately learn their type. The secondary market
takes place.
￿ At t = 2, bonds pay o⁄.
1.2 Self-Ful￿lling Liquidity
In presence of learning by holding, impatient insiders and patient outsiders
may fail to realize gains from trade in the secondary market. Outsiders
cannot disentangle private-value motives to trade (liquidity shocks) from
common-value motives (credit events). Accordingly, patient outsiders who
are being o⁄ered a bond charge a lemons discount. Distressed insiders may
therefore prefer to carry their bonds. Thus, the secondary market may be
illiquid, or break down as in Akerlof (1970): At t = 0; this ine¢ ciency is
anticipated by potential investors. Their reservation price is all the lower
because they expect a small number of insiders, and this may generate mul-
tiple equilibria. In other words, if investors in the primary market fear an
illiquid secondary market, the issuance is not successful, thereby vindicat-
ing investors￿concern about an illiquid secondary market. The mere fear
of future illiquidity su¢ ces to give rise to current and future illiquidity. In
this section, we formalize this intuition by describing the equilibria played
by investors after the issuer has posted a given price p:
Let k 2 f0;n ￿ 1g: Let us compute the expected return from holding
one bond for an investor who expects that k fellow investors will invest in
bonds. This return depends on the liquidity of the date-1 secondary market.
At t = 1:
￿ An insider who is not distressed and knows the bond will not default
has the highest possible date-1 valuation of the bond, and is not willing
to sell it at less than 1.
￿ An insider who knows the bond will default has the lowest valuation,
and is willing to sell it at any nonnegative price.
￿ An impatient insider who knows the bond will not default is willing to
sell it at any price strictly larger than 1 ￿ ￿.
Thus, in the secondary market, the issuer will sell a bond for 1 to the in-
siders who have not tendered their bonds at t = 1, if any. If all insiders have
tendered their bonds, it means either that they are aware of a forthcoming
credit event, or that they are all hit by a liquidity shock. In either case,
there are no possible gains from trade among them. If they are all hit by a
liquidity shock, they could bene￿t from transferring their bonds to a patient
outsider, if any. A patient outsider who receives an o⁄er to purchase bonds
5works out that it means that all the insiders have tendered their bonds,
either because of a credit event or because they are all distressed. Thus, the
reservation price of an outsider is
qk+1(1 ￿ d)
qk+1(1 ￿ d) + d
= 1 ￿
d
qk+1 + d(1 ￿ qk+1)
: (1)
As a result, the market between insiders and outsiders is a lemons market if
1 ￿
d
qk+1 + d(1 ￿ qk+1)




1 ￿ ￿ + ￿qk+1: (2)
If (2) is not satis￿ed, the secondary market is liquid. It is a pooling market,
and all Pareto improving trades between patient and impatient investors
take place. Insiders who receive an aggregate liquidity shock at t = 1 are
penalized because in the eyes of the outsiders, they may just be trying to
get rid of a "lemon" at t = 1. These transfers across future investors￿types
cancel out in the t = 0 reservation price because the t = 1 price (1) charged
by outsiders re￿ ects the ex ante probabilities of each type. To see this, note
that insiders can sell a lemon with probability d, and in this case pocket
qk+1(1 ￿ d)
qk+1(1 ￿ d) + d
per bond. If they are all distressed but hold non defaulting bonds, they lose
1 ￿
qk+1(1 ￿ d)
qk+1(1 ￿ d) + d
per bond. This occurs with probability qk+1 (1 ￿ d). The ex ante pro￿t or
loss from trading with outsiders at this pooling price (1) is therefore
d:
qk+1(1 ￿ d)
qk+1(1 ￿ d) + d




qk+1(1 ￿ d) + d
￿
= 0:
The only risk that potential investors price ex ante is aggregate risk. Their
reservation price for a bond is
(1 ￿ qn￿)(1 ￿ d):
Conversely, if (2) is satis￿ed, potential investors price not only aggregate
risk, but also the risk that all patient agents are outsiders, in which case
liquidity dries up in the secondary market. Thus, if an investor expects that















(1 ￿ d): (3)
(i) is the discount for aggregate liquidity risk.
(ii) is the probability that the bond does not default and that all insiders
are distressed.
(iii) is the probability that at least one outsider is not distressed.
In sum, if (2) is satis￿ed, bonds end up carried by distressed investors
if and only if all insiders are distressed, hence the formula (3). Lemma 1
follows directly from these observations.
Lemma 1
For k 2 f0;n ￿ 1g, let
dk =
￿qk+1






fdkgk2f0;n￿1g and fpkgk2f0;n￿1g are respectively decreasing and increasing
series. If she believes that k other investors invest in the bonds, an investor
has a date-0 reservation bond price equal to
￿
pk if d > dk
pn￿1 if d ￿ dk
:
Lemma 1 has some simple implications for the equilibria of the invest-
ment game conditional on a posted price p. First, if p > pn￿1, then investors
￿nd not investing in bonds to be a dominant strategy. At such a price, the
bond generates a negative excess return regardless of the liquidity in the
secondary market. Conversely, if p < p0, then investing in bonds is a domi-
nant strategy. The bond generates a positive excess return regardless of the
extent of participation. If p 2 [p0;pn￿1], then all the investors investing in
bonds is a possible equilibrium. If p 2 [p0;pn￿1] and d > d0, no investor
investing in bonds is another possible equilibrium, and it is easy to check
that there are no other pure-strategy equilibria. Formally,
Proposition 2 If d > d0 and p 2 [(1 ￿ q￿)(1 ￿ d);(1 ￿ qn￿)(1 ￿ d)], there
are two pure-strategy equilibria, in which all or no investors invest.
Proposition 2 captures liquidity as a self-ful￿lling phenomenon. If in-
vestors expect the market to be liquid, then it is liquid in the sense that the
issuer can price the asset according to standard asset pricing theory. That
7is, she can take only aggregate liquidity risk into account. Conversely, if
investors have a self-justi￿ed concern about liquidity, then the issuer must
price idiosyncratic liquidity risk.
As such, the model cannot deliver accurate predictions for the pric-
ing of liquidity risk. For d > d0, and a bond price within the range
[(1 ￿ q￿)(1 ￿ d);(1 ￿ qn￿)(1 ￿ d)], the expected proceeds from the issuance
are not de￿ned, because it is impossible to assign a probability distribution
over investors￿beliefs about liquidity. It is also of course impossible to solve
for a price that maximizes expected proceeds. Liquidity risk can stand any-
where between a ￿rst-order and a nth-order concern. In the balance of the
paper, we will apply global games techniques to this setup in order to resolve
this indeterminacy, and predict a unique liquidity premium.
2 The Coordination Premium
Following Morris and Shin (1998), a strand of applied literature has used
the theory of global games introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
to pin down a unique rationalizable outcome in presence of strategic comple-
mentarities. The theory of global games readily applies to games of global
strategic complementarities, namely games for which players￿actions are
strategic complements for all values of the parameters. This restriction to
global strategic complementarities turns out to be an important constraint
in applied models that depart from the reduced-form coordination games
typically assumed in global games theory. In such applications, strategic
complementarities often coexist with congestion e⁄ects, and are therefore
not global. This has been an important limitation in ￿nancial economics
in particular. For instance, in the model of bank run of Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005), or in the model of ￿nancial market crash by Morris and
Shin (2004), strategic complementarities fail for all values of the parame-
ters. In both models, if many other agents have liquidated their position,
so that the bank is already bankrupt or that traders have already hit their
risk limits, then liquidations are strategic substitutes, regardless of the fun-
damental value of the asset. The global game argument does not operate
in this case, and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and Morris and Shin (2004)
restrict to monotone strategies5 or impose strong distributional assumptions
to pin down unique outcomes.
Our setup is also a case in which strategic complementarities are not
global. To see this, note that the probability that all insiders are distressed
is smaller when they are more numerous. This reduction in the risk that
all insiders become distressed has ambiguous net implications. The positive
implication is clearly that it is less likely that insiders will have to trade with
5In such strategies, the probability that an agent liquidates her position is assumed to
be a monotonic function of her signal about the value of the asset.
8outsiders. A negative implication, however, is that trading with outsiders is
more costly whenever it occurs. This is because when they are being o⁄ered
the bond, outsiders put more weight on this being driven by a credit event
rather than an aggregate liquidity shock if there are more insiders. Which
e⁄ect dominates depends on the values of the parameters. For instance, if
dk+1 < d < dk
for some k 2 f0;n ￿ 2g, then investing if k +1 fellow investors invest is less
appealing than in the case in which there are only k other insiders. The
k + 1th investor creates overall a negative externality for the others. This
is because the secondary market breaks down in her presence, whereas this
market is liquid if there are only k insiders. Thus, k investors buying a bond
is an asymmetric equilibrium if
pn￿1 > p > pk+1:
An important property of our setup is that, unlike in Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005) and Morris and Shin (2004), the set of parameters for which
decisions to buy the bond are not strategic complements is only [dn￿1;d0];
a strict, bounded subset of all possible fundamentals d. We now show that
in this situation in which strategic complementarity fails only for a bounded
subset of fundamentals, global games techniques partially apply, and they
are all the more e¢ cient because agents have di⁄use posterior beliefs about
the fundamental parameter.
We modify the baseline model as follows. We assume that the probability
of default of the bond is a decreasing function d(x) of a real state variable x.
Our key assumption is that only extreme realizations of the state variable x
are informative about the probability of default. An interpretation of this
condition is that when potential investors conduct due diligence, they only
perform a coarse screening. For instance, Carey et al. (1993) report that
private lenders typically make initial commitments that are merely based
on the memo supplied by the arranger, and that they withdraw from their
initial commitments only when they come across a major misrepresentation
of the borrower￿ s circumstances.
Formally, there exists ￿ > 0 and a measurable function D(:) such that
the probability of default of the bond is
d(x) = D
￿
(x ￿ ￿):1fx￿￿g + (x + ￿):1fx￿￿￿g
￿
;
where D(:) is decreasing, D(0) = d 2 (d0;1), and limx!+1 D(x) = 1 ￿
limx!￿1 D(x) = 0: Figure 1 depicts a typical function d(:).
The state variable e x is realized at date 1 only. The issuer and investors












Figure 1: The function d(.).
where ￿ > 0. At date 0, after the price p has been posted and before making
an invesment decision, each investor i 2 f1;ng privately observes a signal si
such that
si = x + yi:






We assume that f(:) has su¢ ciently fat tails in the sense that logf
is uniformly continuous over R: This restriction is mild in the sense that
the restriction of f to any arbitrarily large compact can be any continuous
density. Power or exponential tails satisfy this condition, but Gaussian tails
do not.
We also impose two restrictions on g(:) that play no role in our main
result, but ease its exposition. We assume that g(￿x) = g(x): This simpli￿es
the expression of the equilibrium price p￿ below, which does not depend on
the distribution g(:) in this case. We also assume that g(:) has bounded
support U, which shortens the proofs.
We will focus on situations in which ￿
￿ is large, in which case realizations
of e x carry very little information about the probability of default unless
extreme. In other words, our focus is on situations that are arbitrarily
close to the baseline model in the sense that the probability of default is
equal to d in most states of nature, but in which a "grain of doubt" about
10other investors￿beliefs su¢ ces to change the rationalizable outcomes of the
investment game.
We let
￿ = d￿1 ([dn￿1;d0]):
In words, ￿ is the set of realizations of e x for which the game is not one of
strategic complementarities. This set is bounded because d(:) is monotonic
and lim+1 d(:) = 1￿lim￿1 d = 0: An important parameter of the model is
￿ = sup
x
fG(x + ￿(￿)) ￿ G(x)g,
where ￿ is the Lebesgue measure. Notice that ￿ is small if ￿(￿) is small












The balance of this section establishes that for ￿ and ￿
￿ su¢ ciently large,












1 ￿ q + ￿qn
#
:
After the issuer posts a price, each investor￿ s strategy is a mapping from
her private signal into a probability to purchase the bond. Let ￿a￿i (s) de-
note the expected pro￿t from buying a bond for investor i 2 f1;ng when she
receives a signal s and believes that the pro￿le of other investors￿strategies
is a￿i = (aj (:))j2f1;ng￿fig. We ￿rst establish the following result.
Lemma 3
Let " > 0. For ￿ su¢ ciently large, if two strategy pro￿les a￿i and b￿i
satisfy
a￿i ￿ b￿i;
then for all signals s





1 ￿ q + ￿qn ￿ ":
Proof of Lemma 3. Let
￿a￿i (x)
denote the expected pro￿t from buying the bond for investor i if her fellow
investors play the pro￿le a￿i and conditionally on the realized state being



























































































￿a￿i (x) ￿ ￿b￿i (x)














This inequality stems from the fact that for x = 2 ￿, the investment game is
one of strategic complementarities. A higher probability that other investors
invest raises the expected pro￿t of investor i:
The following three remarks yield the lower bound for (A) claimed in
Lemma 3:
1. That logf is uniformly continuous and g(:) has bounded support
implies that the function












converges uniformly to g(s ￿ x) as ￿ ! 1.
2. Moreover, for all opponents￿strategy pro￿les c￿i;
8x 2 R; (1 ￿ q￿)(1 ￿ d(x)) ￿ p ￿ ￿c￿i (x) ￿ (1 ￿ qn￿)(1 ￿ d(x)) ￿ p:
3. For all x 2 ￿,
d(x) ￿ dn￿1:
Thus for ￿ su¢ ciently large,






1 ￿ q + ￿qn ￿ ":￿
12An interpretation of Lemma 3 is that ￿
q￿(1￿qn￿1)(1￿q)
1￿q+￿qn measures the dis-
tance between our situation and a game of global strategic complementar-
ities. If the set ￿ was empty, our game would be one of strategic comple-
mentarities, which would imply
a￿i ￿ b￿i ! ￿a￿i ￿ ￿b￿i:
In presence of congestion e⁄ects for some values of the state variable (￿(￿) 6=
0), the mapping a￿i ! ￿a￿i is no longer increasing, but Lemma 3 o⁄ers
an upper bound on the importance of congestion e⁄ects, as measured by
￿b￿i ￿ ￿a￿i.
This upper bound, in turn, yields the following partial characterization






























The function ￿ is increasing, and
lim
+1





Let " > 0: For ￿ su¢ ciently large, if an issuer posts a price p 2 (0;1 ￿ qn￿),
then any equilibrium of the investment game is such that:
￿ An investor who receives a signal s satisfying





1 ￿ q + ￿qn + "
almost surely buys the bond.
￿ An investor who receives a signal s such that





1 ￿ q + ￿qn ￿ "
almost surely turns down the bond.
13Proof of Lemma 4. Fix " > 0 and p 2 (0;1 ￿ qn￿) a posted price. Let
(ai (:))i2f1;ng describe an equilibrium of the investment game. Let
s = supfs s.t. 9i 2 f1;ng s.t. ai (s) < 1g:
This set is non-empty because not buying the bond is a dominant strategy
for s su¢ ciently small. This set admits an upper bound because buying the
bond is a dominant strategy for s su¢ ciently large.
If s is such that 9i 2 f1;ng s.t. ai (s) < 1, by de￿nition there must be
an i(s) 2 f1;ng such that
￿a￿i(s)(s) ￿ 0:
Let fslgl2N be a sequence of elements of this set tending to s. Because the






8l 2 N;￿a￿i0(s’(l)) ￿ 0:
Letting l ! 1,
￿a￿i0(s) ￿ 0:
By de￿nition of s, a strategy pro￿le in which i0
0 s opponents buy the bond
if and only if their signal is larger than s is smaller than the strategy pro￿le
a￿i0. Lemma 3 therefore implies that for ￿ su¢ ciently large,

















Gk (x ￿ s)￿
(1 ￿ G(x ￿ s))
n￿1￿k h(k;x)
3











which converges uniformly to ￿(s) ￿ p as ￿ ! +1: Thus,





1 ￿ q + ￿qn + 2"
for ￿ su¢ ciently large. This proves the ￿rst bullet point in Lemma 4: The
proof of the second bullet point is symmetric.￿
To gain intuition for this result, consider the case in which the investment
game is one of strategic complementarity:
￿(￿) = ￿ = 0:
In this case, when ￿ becomes large, the common prior on e x becomes di⁄use,
and we obtain the standard global game result that all equilibria converge
14to the cut-o⁄ equilibria in which investors buy the bond if and only if their
signal is above a threshold s solving
￿(s) = p:
Lemma 4 shows that a weaker characterization of the equilibria can still be
achieved in our setup. The characterization that we obtain is all the weaker




This characterization of investment equilibria entails the following re-
striction on the set of rationalizable posted prices.
Proposition 5
For ￿ and ￿













1 ￿ q + ￿qn
#
is not optimal.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let p a posted price such that





1 ￿ q + ￿qn = " > 0:
We show that the probability that a bond is accepted at this price tends to
0 as ￿ and ￿
￿ tend to +1.
Let ￿ > 0. We ￿x a ￿ such that Lemma 4 applies for ". (Note that
￿ can be chosen so that Lemma 4 holds for all ￿ > 0.) Take a compact
set K su¢ ciently large that an investor￿ s signal x + yi belongs to K with
probability larger than 1 ￿ ￿ for such a ￿. For ￿
￿ su¢ ciently large, ￿(s) =
p￿ if s 2 K. Lemma 4 implies that p is not accepted for signals smaller
than supK. Thus the bond is accepted with probability less than ￿ by each
investor.
A symmetric argument implies that for a price





1 ￿ q + ￿qn ;
the bond is accepted with an arbitrarily large probability. This establishes
Proposition 5:￿
The intuition for this result is simple. First, the condition that ￿ has
to be su¢ ciently large is standard in global games. It implies that the
private signals received by investors are su¢ ciently more accurate than the
common prior. This condition ensures that the way an investor ranks her
signal among all other signals has a low sensitivity to the realization of
15her signal (see, e.g., Morris and Shin (2003)). This ensures that there is
a unique equilibrium if, in addition, strategic complementarities are global.
This condition on the relative precisions of the prior and the private signals
has recently been challenged by Angeletos and Werning (2006) and Hellwig
et al. (2006). Broadly, they note that if private information is aggregated
in a large market, for instance through publicly observed prices, then public
information cannot be arbitrarily less accurate than private information.
This criticism is less relevant in our context of private placements. Such
deals feature bilateral negotiations about a speci￿c asset between the issuer
and a small number of investors.
The condition on ￿
￿ implies that it is ex ante highly unlikely that an
investor believes in a probability of default signi￿cantly di⁄erent from d
after receiving a signal. This pins down an optimal range of prices for the
issuer that does not depend on her risk-aversion: Prices below this range are
highly likely to be accepted, while prices above this range are highly likely
to be turned down, so that any rational issuer would pick a price within this
range under the conditions stated in Proposition 5. That the issuer gives
up a liquidity premium in order to control the outcome of a global game
is similar to the feature in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) that the bank
reduces the short-term interest rate to mitigate a coordination problem a la
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) among depositors.
If an investor, after having received her signal, puts a high probability
on the event
fx 2 ￿g;
then the iterated dominance argument used in global games has little bite.
Conversely, our setup becomes close to the global game situation when this
posterior probability is uniformly small for all signals. In this case, global
game techniques yield tighter bounds for rationalizable posted prices. The
parameter ￿ is a uniform upper bound on the posterior measure of ￿. This
parameter is small if:
￿ all else equal, ￿ is small. This in turn occurs if d0 and dn￿1 are close
to each other, namely if n is small, if q￿ is small, or if q is close to 1;
￿ all else equal, investors have a su¢ ciently di⁄use posterior on x. Since
their prior is di⁄use (￿ large), this will be the case if, in addition, their
signals are noisy (G(:) ￿ at).
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that (at least) one of these








(1 ￿ d) + 0(q):
16The liquidity premium is much larger than a nth-order premium for
aggregate risk, but becomes negligible for a large n. We now discuss how
the properties of the coordination premium implied by p￿ relate to some
empirical ￿ndings about bond spreads.
3 The "Credit Spread Puzzle"
An important open research question in asset pricing is the so-called "credit
spread puzzle". The credit spread puzzle refers to the fact that the expected
returns that investors require to hold defaultable bonds are signi￿cantly
higher than the ones predicted by widely accepted models. Consider for
instance the excess spread that BBB rated corporate bonds earn over higher
quality (AAA or AA rated) corporate bonds. The historical values reported
for the BBB-AAA spread are around 100 basis points, while the historical
excess credit losses on BBB bonds over AAA or AA bonds are only around
20 basis points.6 Most studies conclude that this 80 basis points di⁄erential
does not square with risk premia or trading frictions in bond markets.
First, as argued by Chen et al. (2006), frictions such as taxes, or the
fact that trade is conducted through costly search and bilateral negotiations
in decentralized corporate bond markets, are highly unlikely to account for
this spread. While such frictions can explain why AAA corporate bonds
command a spread over Treasuries, it is unclear why they would lead to
such a large pricing di⁄erence between BBB and AAA corporate bonds:
These investment grade bonds are all traded in identical conditions by the
same investors.
Second, the 80 basis points di⁄erence between excess expected credit
losses and the BBB-AAA spread could in theory stem from risk premia.
If bonds tend to default in "bad times" - when bondholders have a high
marginal utility of consumption - then bondholders would require a large
risk premium to bear default risk. Yet, the calibration of a large class of
structural models with plausible risk premia conducted by Huang and Huang
(2003) generate BBB-AAA spreads of 30 basis points that fall well short of
historical values. Using the very volatile pricing kernel that Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) use to reproduce the U.S. equity premium, Chen et al.
(2006) ￿nd BBB-AAA spreads of less than 80 basis points. They need to
assume additional sources of risk such as counter-cyclical default boundaries
to ￿t the data. In this sense, the required return on bonds is more "puzzling"
than the required return on equity, since even the large countercyclical risk
aversion that explains the equity premium does not account for the whole
BBB-AAA spread.
In light of this "puzzle", it is interesting to note that in our model, in
which investors are price-takers and risk-neutral, and in which there are no
6See Amato and Remolona (2003) or Huang and Huang (2003).
17transaction costs, learning by holding implies that su¢ ciently risky bonds
(d > d0) command a spread over safer bonds (d < dn￿1) above and beyond
compensation for the higher expected credit losses. At ￿rst-order w.r.t. q,











Interestingly, for bonds such that d > d0, the coordination component
of the total spread is a smaller fraction of the entire spread when the prob-
ability of default is higher. This is consistent with the data. For instance,
Amato and Remolona (2003) report that expected credit losses constitute
respectively 12% and 57% of the total spread for BBB and B bonds respec-
tively.
In sum, the excess return generated by coordination risk both vanishes
for virtually risk-free bonds, and has a low sensitivity to risk for higher
default levels. That the coordination premium varies in a highly nonlin-
ear fashion with credit risk is in line with empirical features of spreads on
defaultable bonds.
As mentioned in the introduction, learning by holding is particularly
plausible in the case of privately placed bonds. We do not rule it out com-
pletely for public issuances, given that even public corporate bonds trade
infrequently in a decentralized market, and that most issuances end up held
by a small number of sophisticated investors (Schultz, 2001). Still, we would
expect that this phenomenon is by de￿nition more pronounced for private
bonds. Accordingly, Zwick (1980), and Carey et al. (1993) report that
privately placed bonds earn a signi￿cantly higher spread than otherwise
comparable publicly traded bonds.
Finally, Longsta⁄ et al. (2005) ￿nd that the time-variations of the non-
default components of bond spreads are correlated with various proxies for
changes in aggregate liquidity (changes in the yield spread between o⁄-the-
run and on-the-run Treasuries, in￿ ows in money market funds, and new
corporate bonds issuances.) In our model, increases in aggregate demand
for liquidity such as an increase in q or ￿ for all investors also raises the
coordination premium across all ratings. Coordination problems essentially
amplify the consequences of liquidity shocks in our model, so that the coor-
dination premium is sensitive to aggregate changes in liquidity risk.
4 Discussion
4.1 Loss Given Default and Liquidity
For expositional simplicity, we have assumed that defaulted bonds are worth-
less. In this section, we study a simple extension in wich the loss given default
18on bonds is not 100%, but rather some l 2 [0;1]: That a defaulted bond has
some recovery value reduces the cost of coordination. Insiders can split the
claims to the cash ￿ ows generated by their bonds into two "tranches." They
can issue a senior risk-free security that pays 1 ￿ l, and an equity tranche
that bears the credit losses l in case of default. Such arrangements are
commonplace in practice in securitization deals. The senior tranche is not
information-sensitive, and can always be transferred to patient agents in the
secondary market. Thus, its t = 0 spread re￿ ects only aggregate liquidity
risk. Conversely, the equity tranche is identical to the bonds with 100%
loss given default studied in the previous section. Its t = 0 spread therefore
features a coordination premium. Thus the limiting price p￿ becomes
















At ￿rst order w.r.t. q;
p￿ = 1 ￿ dl ￿
q￿
n
(1 ￿ d)l: (5)
If the expected loss given default decreases with the credit rating (see, e.g.,
Schuermann, 2004 for evidence supporting this point), then the coordination
premium in (5)
q￿
n (1 ￿ d)l may be larger in absolute terms as the credit
rating is lower. The reduction of the loss given default when rating improves
may counterbalance the increase in 1 ￿ d: In the data, the coordination
premium is larger in absolute terms for lower ratings7 (but is a smaller
fraction of the total spread as already mentioned).
4.2 Private Information and Liquidity
For expositional simplicity, we have assumed an extreme form of "learning
by holding," in which bondholders perfectly learn the bonds￿￿nal payo⁄.
In this section, we let the magnitude of the informational advantage that
insiders have over outsiders vary. Formally, we assume that insiders learn
the date-2 payo⁄ with a probability k 2 (0;1): The previous sections dealt
with the k = 1 case. If k < 1, there are three date-1 states of nature in
which insiders seek to transfer bonds to patient outsiders:
￿ the state in which all insiders are distressed and know the bond will
not default;
￿ the state in which insiders know the bond will default;
￿ a third state in which all insiders are distressed and have not learned
anything about the ￿nal payo⁄.
7See, e.g., Huang and Huang (2003)
19The secondary market is e¢ cient if trade with patient outsiders takes
place in each of these three states. Accordingly, there are now two possible
degrees of ine¢ ciency. The secondary market may break down in either one
or two of these states. First, it may be that distressed insiders who know
that the bond will not default are not willing to trade, but that when insiders
are distressed and uninformed, they are willing to trade. Second, adverse
selection may be so severe that even distressed and uninformed insiders are
not willing to trade at date 1:
If there are l 2 f1;ng insiders at date 1, distressed insiders who know
that the bond will not default are not willing to trade if
(1 ￿ d)ql
(1 ￿ kd)ql + kd




ql + k(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ql)
: (6)
Similarly, if inequality (6) is satis￿ed, insiders who are distressed and unin-
formed are not willing to trade if
(1 ￿ k)ql (1 ￿ d)
(1 ￿ k)ql + kd
< (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ d);
or
d >
￿ (1 ￿ k)
(1 ￿ ￿)k
ql:
To simplify the discussion, assume
q + k(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿) >
k(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ k)qn￿1; (7)
Condition (7) is satis￿ed if other things equal, k is su¢ ciently small. In
this case, there exists d satisfying
￿q
q + k(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)
< d <
￿ (1 ￿ k)
(1 ￿ ￿)k
qn: (8)
For such a d, the reservation price of an investor who expects l other investors
to buy the bond is:




k￿ (1 ￿ d)
= (1 ￿ qn (1 ￿ k)￿)(1 ￿ d) ￿ ql+1k￿ (1 ￿ d):
The second term on the right-hand side is the expected cost of carrying the
bond while impatient because of a secondary market breakdown. Such a
breakdown occurs only if the insiders are all distressed and know that the
bond will not default.
20By contrast, if
d >
￿ (1 ￿ k)
(1 ￿ ￿)k
q;
then the reservation price of an investor who expects l other investors to
buy the bond does not depend on k:




￿ (1 ￿ d):
This is simply because in this case, the secondary market breaks down as
soon as all insiders are distressed regardless of their degree of information.
Clearly, the equilibrium selection techniques introduced in Section 2
readily apply to the case of imperfect learning, and yield the following re-
sult.8
Proposition 6
In the model of Section 2, assume that insiders learn the date-2 payo⁄ at
date 1 with probability k 2 (0;1) only, and that d satis￿es (8). The limiting
price p￿ in Proposition 3 becomes
p￿ =
￿













at ￿rst order w.r.t. q: A decrease in k reduces the coordination premium.
In fact, a decrease in k plays the same role as a decrease in the loss given
default l in (5). This is because decreases in k and l both reduce the fraction
of the future cash ￿ ows that can possibly su⁄er from a lemons problem in
case of coordination failure. Thus, decreases in k and l ease coordination
for the same reason.
4.3 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis of learning by holding suggests an interesting new interpreta-
tion of the recent subprime mortgage crisis. The general realization in sum-
mer 2007 that CDOs backed by U.S. subprime mortgages would experience
higher than expected credit losses had a surprisingly large destabilizing im-
pact. Spreads surged and liquidity suddenly dried up in the subprime CDO
market. This then triggered a money market breakdown and ultimately
8The only modi￿cation of the proof is that the function h(:;:) and the set ￿ would have
di⁄erent expressions. But ￿ would still be bounded, and h(:;:) would still be increasing
in its second argument, which is all that is needed.
21important disruptions in interbank markets, because many short-term in-
struments were backed by highly rated subprime CDO tranches. Many ob-
servers argue that adverse selection does not explain this market breakdown.
The rising concern about credit risk was symmetric and market-wide: It is
unlikely that any agent had inside information on the exact impact of future
subprime delinquencies in summer 2007.9 The view that gained momentum
is that the subprime crisis is best explained by the rise of Knightian un-
certainty.10 In this view, liquidity crises arise when investors can no longer
assign probabilities to future contingencies. This increase in immeasurable
risk leads them to resort to very conservative "worst-case scenario" decision
rules that cause market breakdowns.
The liquidity implications of "learning by holding" o⁄er an alternative
view on the subprime meltdown in which neither a lemons problem nor a
sudden inability to measure subprime risk play a role. According to our
model, liquidity spreads increase with respect to default risk in a highly
nonlinear fashion in the presence of learning by holding. Thus, it may be
that a public and modest upwards revision of future subprime delinquencies
had a disproportionate impact on the discount rates used to price subprime
CDOs. This is because expected defaults crossed the threshold above which
potential investors feared that future lemons problems would occur, once
credit losses eventually materialize and worm their way through the ￿nancial
system.
Viewing the subprime crisis as the rise of a coordination problem o⁄ers
some guidance on ways to restore liquidity in securitization markets. It
is the conjunction of "learning by holding" together with uncertainty over
market participation - captured in our model by simultaneous investment
decisions and a price-posting mechanism - that triggers possible coordina-
tion failures.11 Accordingly, reducing uncertainty about market participa-
tion through the adoption of more organized trading mechanisms in CDO
markets would improve liquidity. The key is that potential investors re-
ceive credible signals about current market thickness, so that they are not
concerned about possible future lemons problem caused by "learning by
holding".
9See, e.g., "Is the Credit Crunch a Lemons Problem?" by Buiter and Sibert,
http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/09/is-the-credit-c.html.
10See "The Long and the Short of it", The Economist, August 30th 2007. See also
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007) for a formal approach.
11A referee has pointed out that posting a pricing schedule that increases with the
realized number of buyers is a simple theoretical solution to the coordination problem
that we study. This contracting variable seems easy to manipulate in practice, however.
The arranger could ask straw men to carry the assets for some time.
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